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Abstract
This paper studies the quantitative implications of changes in the
composition of taxes for long-run growth and expected lifetime utility
in the UK economy over 1970-2005. Our setup is a dynamic stochastic
general equilibrium model incorporating a detailed scal policy struc-
ture, and where the engine of endogenous growth is human capital
accumulation. The governments spending instruments include pub-
lic consumption, investment and education spending. On the revenue
side, labour, capital and consumption taxes are employed. Our results
suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth
by altering relative tax rates, then it should reduce labour taxes while
simultaneously increasing capital or consumption taxes to make up for
the loss in labour tax revenue. In contrast, a welfare promoting policy
would be to cut capital taxes, while concurrently increasing labour or
consumption taxes to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue.
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1 Introduction
The relationship between the governments tax structure (distribution of rev-
enue by type of tax) and the economys long-run growth rate has always re-
ceived a great deal of theoretical and empirical attention (see e.g. Turnovsky
(1995) at theoretical level and Auerbach (2006) at policy level). A robust
nding of the literature, based on calibrated dynamic general equilibrium
(DGE) models, is that the growth e¤ects of tax reforms are likely to be
small (see e.g. Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995)). There has also
been a lot of empirical work conducted on the link between growth rates and
tax structure (see, e.g. Mendoza et al. (1997) and also Angelopoulos et al.
(2007a) for a recent review of this literature). Broadly consistent with the
ndings of the quantitative DGE models, the preponderance of estimation
evidence suggests that tax reform has either small or insignicant e¤ects on
growth.
In contrast to research on tax structure and growth, much less work has
been undertaken on the welfare e¤ects of altering the tax policy mix. Notable
exceptions include the U.S. DGE studies by Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen
(1992) and the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) study by
McGrattan (1994). These papers conclude, in contrast to the growth studies
discussed above, that the welfare e¤ects of reforming the tax structure can
be substantial.
The broad issue of tax reform and its economics consequences has recently
moved back to centre stage in U.K. academic and policy circles (see e.g.
the ongoing research for the Mirrlees Review, available at the IFS website).
Despite this increased interest, we are not aware of any quantitative studies
which attempt to assess the general equilibrium growth and welfare e¤ects
of the tax structure on the UK economy.
In light of the above, in this paper, we conduct tax policy analysis for
the UK economy over 1970-2005 using a DSGE setup. Our model is a sto-
chastic variant of Lucas(1990) well-known model in which human capital
accumulation is the engine of endogenous growth. We extend Lucasmodel
in four ways. First, by allowing for a more realistic disaggregation of gov-
ernment spending into its basic growth and utility enhancing activities, i.e.
public investment, education and consumption. Second, by including a con-
sumption tax1, which allows us to examine the growth and welfare trade-
o¤s between income (capital and labor) and consumption taxes, as in e.g.
Cooley and Hansen (1992)2. Third, by allowing for externalities from per
1Note that taxes on goods and services constitute about 28.5% of total tax revenue in
the UK, see, e.g. IMF Government Finance Statistics.
2Cooley and Hansen (1992) work with a di¤erent (deterministic) model, which does
2
capita aggregate human capital (see e.g. Lucas (1988) and Tamura (1991)).
Fourth, by allowing for uncertainty when calculating welfare as in e.g. Mc-
Grattan (1994).3 Our welfare evaluations (where welfare is measured as
expected lifetime utility of the representative household) follow recent devel-
opments in micro-founded DSGE models applied mainly in examining the
welfare implications of di¤erent (monetary and scal) stabilization policies
(see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007)). However these papers do
not consider the welfare e¤ects of the tax structure and also do not allow for
(endogenous) growth.
In our analysis, we focus on two types of policy experiments. First, the
case in which changes in one of the three distorting tax rates (capital, labour,
consumption) are met by changes in lump-sum transfers/taxes. Working
vis-a-vis the benchmark case in which a lump-sum policy instrument is the
residually adjusted variable, helps us to identify and understand the e¤ects
of each distorting tax policy instrument. Second, the more interesting case
in which changes in one of the three distorting tax rates are met by changes
in another distorting tax rate. Working in this way, allows us to assess the
e¤ects of changing the composition of distorting tax rates.
The results of our analysis suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to
promote long-run growth by replacing one distorting tax rate with another,
then it should reduce labour taxes, while simultaneously increasing capital
or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in labour tax revenue. Lucas
(1990) also reports negative e¤ects on the growth rate by increasing the
labour tax, while decreasing the capital tax. This is because human capital
is an engine of endogenous growth. However, both in Lucas (1990) and here,
the growth e¤ects of changes in the relative tax rates are small. For instance,
if the tax rate on labour is reduced by about 10%, the net growth rate would
increase to about 2.43% (when the capital tax increases) or to about 2.42%
(when the consumption tax increases), from the data average of 2.41%. Our
results are hence consistent with the ndings in Stokey and Rebelo (1995),
who compare the growth e¤ects of the tax structure in di¤erent models and
conclude that these e¤ects are likely to be around the range suggested by
Lucas (1990).
not consider human capital and does not allow for endogenous growth. Hence, they do
not examine the growth e¤ects of the tax structure. In addition, they focus (as in Lucas
(1990)) in discrete tax reforms, i.e. in changes in the tax structure involving setting one
tax rate to zero, whereas we focus on changes in the tax rates that are within the historical
experience of the UK.
3McGrattan (1994) also does not consider human capital and does not allow for endoge-
nous growth. In addition, she focuses on capital and labour taxes and does not consider
consumption taxes.
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In contrast, if the goal of tax policy is to promote welfare, then policy
makers should cut capital taxes, while concurrently increasing labour or con-
sumption taxes to make up for the loss in capital tax revenue. For instance,
the welfare gains of substituting the capital tax with the labour tax are about
1% of extra consumption in each time period for a 10% decrease in the cap-
ital tax. Again, the UK results are similar in magnitude to those reported
for the USA by Lucas (1990). The welfare gains from decreasing the capital
tax by 10% and increasing the consumption tax to make up for the loss in
tax revenue is about 1.5% of extra consumption in each time period. There
are also welfare gains from substituting the labour tax with the consumption
tax, of the order of 0.25% for a 10% decrease in the labour tax.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
theoretical model. Section 3 discusses the data, calibration and the long run
solution. Section 4 contains the results and Section 5 concludes. Additionally,
an Appendix presents information on the second-order welfare function.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section, building on Lucas(1990) model, we present and solve a DSGE
model in which the engine of endogenous, long-term growth is human capital
accumulation.4 To conduct our policy analysis, in comparison to the Lucas
setup, we add: (a) Externalities generated by the average stock of human
capital in the society. This can in turn justify public education expendi-
ture. (b) A rather detailed spending-tax mix on the part of the government.
Specically, the government spends on education, infrastructure investment,
public consumption and lump-sum transfers. On the other side of the budget,
the government imposes taxes on capital income, labour income and private
consumption spending.5 (c) We operate in a stochastic environment which
allows us to account for the e¤ects of uncertainty on welfare.
The general equilibrium solution of the model consists of a system of
dynamic relations jointly specifying the paths of output, private consump-
4We choose Lucasmodel because it is well known and its conclusions are rather robust
to changes in parameter values (see Stokey and Rebelo (1995)). Note that, in our model,
long-term growth can also be generated by accumulation in public infrastructure capital.
Nevertheless, since human capital is optimally chosen, while government policy is exoge-
nously set, the engine of endogenous growth is essentially human capital accumulation.
5As is typical in the literature, the three types of government expenditure have distinct
roles: public investment augments public infrastructure capital that can provide produc-
tion externalities to rms; public education spending can enhance the productivity of
householdsprivate education choices; public consumption goods and services can provide
direct utility to households. See e.g. Turnovsky (1995) for a review book.
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tion, private physical capital, the growth rate of human capital, the fractions
of time allocated to work, education and leisure, public capital, and one
residually determined policy instrument. To obtain these paths, we solve the
second-order approximation of our models equilibrium conditions around the
deterministic steady-state (see also e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)).
In contrast to solutions which impose certainty equivalence, the solution of
the second-order system allows us to take account of the uncertainty agents
face when making decisions. More importantly, as pointed out by Woodford
(2003), Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and many others, the second-order
approximation to the models policy function helps to avoid potential spuri-
ous welfare rankings which may arise under certainty equivalence. In other
words, when we evaluate di¤erent policies and regimes, we will approximate
both the equilibrium solution and welfare (dened as the conditional expec-
tation of lifetime utility) to second-order (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2007)). This represents a departure from the earlier literature (see e.g. Lucas
(1990) and Cooley and Hansen (1992)).
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical households indexed
by the superscript h and identical rms indexed by the superscript f , where
h; f = 1; 2; :::; Nt. The population size, Nt, evolves at a constant rate n  1,
so that Nt+1 = nNt where N0 is given. Each households preferences are
given by the following time-separable function:
E0
1X
t=0
tU(Cht ; l
h
t ; G
c
t) (1)
where E0 is the conditional expectations operator; Cht is private consumption
of household h at time t; lht is leisure of household h at time t; G
c
t is average
(per household) public consumption goods and services at time t; and 0 <
 < 1 is the subjective rate of time preference. The instantaneous utility
function, Uht = U(C
h
t ; l
h
t ; G
c
t), is increasing in all its arguments, concave and
satises the Inada conditions. Specically, we use a Cobb-Douglas form in
composite consumption and leisure:
Uht =
[(Cht + G
c
t)
(lht )
1 ]1 
1   (2)
where, 1= ( > 1) is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution between
consumption in adjacent periods, 0 <  < 1 is the weight given to composite
consumption, (Cht + G
c
t), relative to leisure, and  is the weight given to
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public consumption in composite consumption. The way we model composite
consumption is as in e.g. Ashauer (1985) and Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992).
Each household h saves in the form of investment, Ip;ht ; and receives in-
terest income, rtK
p;h
t , where rt is the return to private capital and K
p;h
t is
the beginning-of-period private capital stock (the superscript p refers to pri-
vate, as opposed to public, physical capital). Each household has one unit of
time in each period t, which is allocated between leisure, lht ; work, u
h
t ; and
education, eht , so that l
h
t + u
h
t + e
h
t = 1. A household with a stock of human
capital, Hht receives labour income, wtu
h
tH
h
t , where wt is the wage rate and
uhtH
h
t is hs e¤ective labour. Finally, each household receives dividends paid
by rms, ht ; and an average (per household) lump-sum transfer/tax, G
o
t :
Accordingly, the budget constraint of each household is:
(1 +  ct)C
h
t + I
p;h
t = (1   kt )(rtKp;ht +ht ) + (1   lt)wtuhtHht +G
o
t (3)
where 0   ct ;  kt ;  lt < 1 are respectively the tax rates on consumption, capital
income and labour income.
Each households physical and human evolve according to:
Kp;ht+1 = (1  p)Kp;ht + Ip;ht (4)
and
Hht+1 = (1  h)Hht +
 
ehtH
h
t
1  
H t
1 1 eBt (5)
where, 0  p; h  1 are constant depreciation rates on private physical
and human capital respectively. The second expression on the r.h.s. of (5),
consisting of three multiplicative terms, can be interpreted as the quantity of
newhuman capital created at time period t. This expression is comprised
of the following arguments: (i)
 
ehtH
h
t

is h0s e¤ective human capital; (ii)
H t is the average (per household) human capital stock in the society;6 (iii)eBt  B (get )2 represents human capital productivity, where B > 0 is a
constant scale parameter and get is average (per household) public education
expenditure expressed in e¢ ciency units (see below).7 The parameters 0 <
1  1; 0  (1  1) < 1 and 0  2 < 1 capture the productivity of private
6The assumption that individual human capital accumulation is an increasing function
of the per capita level of economy-wide human capital encapsulates the idea that the
existing know-how of the economy provides an external positive e¤ect. Equivalently it
can be thought of as a learning-by-doing e¤ect as discussed in Romer (1986). Examples
of other papers which use the per capita level of aggregate human capital in either the
goods or human capital production functions include Lucas (1988), Azariadis and Drazen,
(1990), Tamura (1991) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1992).
7The assumption that individual human capital accumulation depends on the per
6
human capital, aggregate human capital externality and public education
spending respectively.8
Households act competitively by taking prices, policy variables and ag-
gregate outcomes as given. Thus, each household h chooses fCht ; uht ; eht ; lht ; Iht ;
Kp;ht+1; H
h
t+1g1t=0 to maximize (1) subject to (3), (4), (5), the time constraint
lht + u
h
t + e
h
t = 1, and initial conditions for K
p;h
0 and H
h
0 .
Substituting (4) into (3) for Iht and using the time constraint for l
h
t , we
derive the rst-order conditions. Specically, the static optimality conditions
for consumption, Cht , work e¤ort, u
h
t , and education, e
h
t are (where 
h
t and
	ht are multipliers associated with (3) and (5) respectively):
[(Cht + G
c
t)
(lht )
1 ]1 
(Cht + G
c
t)
= ht (1 + 
c
t) (6)
(1  )[(Cht + G
c
t)
(lht )
1 ]1 
(1  uht   eht )
= ht (1 + 
l
t)wtH
h
t (7)
and
	ht =
ht
 
1   lt

wtH
h
t
B1
 
eht
1 1  Hht 1  H t1 1 (get )2 . (8)
The Euler-equations for private physical capital, Kp;ht+1, and human capi-
tal, Hht+1, are:
ht = Et

ht+1

1  p +  1   kt+1 rt+1	 (9)
and
	ht = Et
 
ht+1
 
1   lt+1

wt+1u
h
t+1

+ (10)
+Et
n
	ht+1
h
1  h +B1
 
eht+1
1  
Hht+1
1 1  
H t+1
1 1  
get+1
2io :
household public education share, get , is consistent with the goal of public education policy
in practice, as well as with theoretical work (see e.g. Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and
Blankenau (2005)). Blankenau (2005, pp. 493-4) also has a good discussion of the e¤ects
of public education on studentsachievement. As he points out, assuming a positive e¤ect
is not uncontroversial, this is why public expenditures "are included with a parameter 2
to gauge their relative importance in producing human capital".
8The parameter restrictions in (5) imply increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the social
level. Lucas (1988) and Benhabib and Perli (1994) are examples of other studies which
employ the IRS assumption in either or both the physical and human capital production
functions. Finally, note that following e.g. Lucas (1988), we assume that human capital
is basically the only private input in human capital accumulation.
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2.2 Firms
To produce its homogenous nal product, Y ft , each rm f chooses private
physical capital, Kp:ft , and e¤ective labour, u
f
tH
f
t ; and also takes advantage
of public infrastructure. The production function of each rm f is:
Y ft = eAt Kp;ft 1 uftHft 1 1 (11)
where eAt  At (kgt )2 represents total factor productivity, where At is an ex-
ogenous stochastic process whose motion is dened below, and kgt is average
(per rm) public infrastructure capital expressed in e¢ ciency units (see be-
low). The parameters 0 < 1 < 1; 0 < (1  1) < 1 and 0  2 < 1 capture
the productivity of private capital, private labour and public infrastructure
respectively.9
Firms act competitively by taking prices, policy variables and aggregate
outcomes as given. Accordingly, subject to (11), each rm f chooses Kp;ft
and uftH
f
t to maximize a series of static prot functions:
ft = Y
f
t   rtKp;ft   wtuftHft . (12)
The resulting familiar rst-order conditions are:
(1  1)Y ft
uftH
f
t
= wt (13)
1Y
f
t
Kp;ft
= rt. (14)
2.3 Government budget constraint
Total expenditure on public consumption, Gct , public infrastructure invest-
ment, Git, public education, G
e
t , and lump-sum transfers/taxes, G
o
t , are -
nanced by total tax revenue from capital income, labour income and con-
sumption spending. Thus,
Gct+G
i
t+G
e
t +G
o
t = 
k
t
NtX
h=1

rtK
p;h
t +
h
t

+  lt
NtX
h=1
wtu
h
tH
h
t + 
c
t
NtX
h=1
Cht (15)
where only six of the seven (Gct ; G
i
t; G
e
t ; G
o
t ; 
k
t ; 
l
t; 
c
t) policy instruments can
be exogenously set with the seventh residually determined (see below).We
9The parameter restrictions in (11) imply increasing returns to scale (IRS) at the social
level. See e.g. Baxter and King (1993) for the same production function.
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use a balanced budget. Ignoring public debt is not critical here since changes
in lump-sum taxes/transfers are equivalent to debt nancing (see e.g. Baxter
and King (1993)).
Also note that public capital (Kgt ) evolves according to:
Kgt+1 = (1  g)Kgt +Git (16)
where, 0  g  1 is a constant depreciation rate on public capital.
2.4 Stationary decentralized competitive equilibrium
Given the paths of six of the seven policy instruments and initial conditions
for the state variables, (Kp0 ; H0; K
g
0 ) ; a decentralized competitive equilib-
rium (DCE) is dened to be a sequence of allocations fCt; ut; et; Kpt+1; Ht+1;
Kgt+1g1t=0, prices frt; wtg1t=0 and one policy instrument, such that (i) house-
holds maximize utility; (ii) rms maximize prots; (iii) all markets clear;
and (iv) the government budget constraint is satised in each time period.
Market clearing values will be denoted without the superscripts h; f .
Since the model allows for long-term growth, we transform variables to
make them stationary. We rst dene per capita quantities for any variable
X as X t  Xt=Nt, where Xt  (Yt; Ct; Kpt ; Kgt ; Ht; Gct ; Git; Get ; Got ). We next
express these quantities as shares of per capita human capital, e.g. xt 
X t=H t, and dene the gross human capital growth rate as t  H t+1=H t.
Using this notation, substituting out prices frt; wtg1t=0 and substituting
for t and t+1 in (8) and (10) respectively, we obtain the following per
capita stationary DCE:
yt = At (k
p
t )
1 (ut)
(1 1)(kgt )
2 (17a)
ntk
p
t+1   (1  p) kpt + ct + gct + git + get = yt (17b)
nt = 1  h + (et)1 B (get )2 (17c)
(1 +  ct)t =  (ct + g
c
t )
(1 ) 1 (1  ut   et)(1 )(1 ) (17d)
ntk
g
t+1   (1  g) kgt = git (17e)
t =  (t)
(1 ) 1Et

t+1

1  p + (1  
k
t+1)1yt+1
kpt+1

(17f)
(1 )ut (ct + gct )(1 ) (1 ut et)(1 )(1 ) 1 = t(1 1)
 
1   lt

yt (17g)
 t =
 (ct + g
c
t )
(1 ) 1 (1  ut   et)(1 )(1 )(1  1)
 
1   lt

yt
(1 +  ct)ut1 (et)
1 1B (get )
2
(17h)
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 t =  (t)
(1 ) 1Et

t+1 (1  1)
 
1   lt+1

yt+1
	
+ (17i)
 (t)
(1 ) 1Et
n
 t+1
h
1  h + 1 (et+1)1 B
 
get+1
2io
gct + g
i
t + g
e
t + g
o
t = 
k
t1yt + 
l
t(1  1)yt +  ctct (17j)
where t and  t are the transformed shadow prices associated with (3) and
(5) respectively in the households problem.10
Therefore, the stationary DCE is summarized by the above system of ten
equations in the paths of t, yt, ct, ut; et, k
p
t+1, k
g
t+1; t,  t, and one residually
determined policy instrument. This equilibrium is given the assumed policy
regime and the paths of exogenous stochastic variables which are dened
below.
2.5 Alternative tax structures
Regarding policy instruments, we rst express each government spending
item, which has already been written as share of H t, as a share of output.
That is, we dene:
gjt  egjt yt (18)
where [j = c; i; e; o] and egjt  Gjt=Yt.
We thus have seven stationary policy instruments, (egct ; egit; eget ; egot ;  kt ;  lt;  ct),
out of which only six can be set exogenously. Given that we wish to examine
the implications of changes in the composition of taxes, we rst examine
the case in which changes in each of the distorting tax rates ( c,  l;  k), in
turn, is met by changes in lump-sum transfers/taxes, ego, holding the spending
instrument rates at their data averages. This experiment helps us identify the
general equilibrium e¤ects of each distorting tax policy instrument relative to
a non-distorting base. We next examine the case in which changes in each of
the three distorting tax rates, in turn, is met by opposite changes in each of
the remaining distorting tax rates. As in the rst experiment, the spending
instrument rates are held at their data averages. Further details are provided
at the beginning of Section 4 below.
2.6 Process for technology
We next specify the evolution of exogenous stochastic variables. Given the
above assumptions, only total factor productivity, At, is stochastic among
10Note that t = t=H
(1 ) 1
t and  t = 	t=H
(1 ) 1
t where h-superscripts are omit-
ted in a symmetric equilibrium.
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the exogenous variables. Following usual practice in the RBC literature, we
assume that At follows an AR(1) process:
At = A
(1 a)A
a
t 1e
"at (19)
where A > 0 is a constant, 0 < a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter and
"at  iid(0; 2a) are the random shocks to productivity.
3 Data, Calibration and Steady-State
3.1 Data
The models structural parameters relating to preferences, production and
physical and human capital accumulation are next calibrated using annual
data for the United Kingdom from 1970-2005. The data are obtained from
the OECD, IMF, ECFIN and the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS). The
OECD databases include: (i) Main Economic Indicators (MEI); (ii) Eco-
nomic Outlook (EO); (iii) International Sectoral Database (ISDB); and (iv)
OECD Statistics. The IMF data is from the International Financial Sta-
tistics (IFS) database. E¤ective tax rates are obtained from the ECFIN
E¤ective Average Tax Base (see Martinez-Mongay, 2000). Public spending
on education data are obtained from ONS. As our aim is to use the model
to evaluate long-run growth and welfare around the steady-state, it is im-
portant that the calibrated parameters imply a sensible long-run solution.
This provides the criterion for choosing those parameters we cannot retrieve
from the data or previous empirical studies, especially the exponents in the
production function for human capital.
3.2 Calibration
The numeric values for the models parameters are reported in Table 1. To
calibrate the model, we work as follows. We set the value of (1  1) equal
to labours share in income (i.e. 0:601) using the ISDB dataset. Given
labours share, capitals share, 1, is then determined residually. Following
e.g. Baxter and King (1993), we set a2 equal to the public investment share
in GDP (i.e. 0:011), as obtained from the EO database. The population
gross growth rate n is calculated using IFS data to be 1:003.
The discount rate, 1= is equal to 1 plus the ex-post real interest rate,
where we use the ex-post real interest rate from MEI. This implies a value
0:976 for . Following Kydland (1995, ch. 5, p. 134), we set , the weight
given to composite consumption relative to leisure in the utility function,
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equal to the average value of work versus leisure time, which is obtained
using data on hours worked from the EO database.11 Given the lack of
relevant data, we follow the study by Baier and Glomm (2001), and set the
relative weight of public consumption services in composite consumption at
 = 0:1. We also use a value for the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
(1=) that is common in the DSGE literature (i.e.  = 2).
Table 1: Parameter Values
parameter value denition
A > 0 0.234 technological progress in goods production
B > 0 0.204 technological progress in human capital production
0 < 1 < 1 0.399 productivity of private capital
0 < 1  1 < 1 0.601 productivity of e¤ective labour
0 < 2 < 1 0.011 productivity of public capital
0 <  < 1 0.976 rate of time preference
0    1 0.100 public consumption weight in composite consumption
0 <  < 1 0.347 composite consumption weight in utility
 > 1 2.000 1= is the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
n  1 1.003 population growth
0  p  1 0.050 depreciation rate on private capital
0  g  1 0.050 depreciation rate on private capital
0  h  1 0.018 depreciation rate on public capital
0 < ege < 1 0.049 public education spending share of output
0 < egi < 1 0.011 public investment spending share of output
0 < egc < 1 0.223 public consumption spending share of output
0 < ego < 1 0.169 other public spending share of output
0 <  l < 1 0.265 labour tax rate
0 <  k < 1 0.470 capital tax rate
0 <  c < 1 0.185 consumption tax rate
0  1  1 0.510 productivity of household human capital
0  1  1  1 0.490 productivity of aggregate human capital
0  2  1 0.050 productivity of public education spending
0 < a< 1 0.920 AR(1) parameter technology
a> 0 0.030 std. dev. of technology innovations
Regarding the scal policy parameters, we employ data averages. For
example, we use data from ONS to obtain the mean of public education
11To obtain this we divide total hours worked by total hours available for work or leisure,
following e.g. Ho and Jorgenson (2001). For example, they assume that there are 14 hours
available for work or leisure on a daily basis with the remaining 10 hours accounted for
by physiological needs.
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spending as a share of GDP, which gives ege = 0:049. EO data give egi =
0:011 for the government investment spending share and egc = 0:272 for the
government consumption spending share. To avoid double counting in the
government budget constraint, we have to adjust this ratio since government
education spending is recorded as government consumption spending in the
national accounts. Thus we set egc = 0:272   0:049 = 0:223. We also use
the e¤ective average tax rates from the ECFIN paper by Martinez-Mongay
(2000) for 1970-2000, to obtain the average tax rates as  k = 0:47,  l = 0:265
and  c = 0:185.12 It is interesting to point out that, in the UK, labour taxe
revenue is lower than in most of EU countries, while revenue from taxes on
capital is higher than the EU-27 average and consumption taxes are below
the EU-27 average.13The budget constraint then implies ego = 0:169. It is
important to point out that, given the above data averages, all tax regimes
dened above imply the same long-run solution.
To accurately gauge the persistence of TFP shocks, we estimate theAR(1)
relation given by (19) using TFP data from the ONS. The estimated values
for a is 0:92 and is signicant at less than the 1% level of signicance. The
standard deviation of this process, a, is 0:03.
A monetary valued measure for human capital is needed to calibrate the
scale parameters A and B. In particular, model consistent values for A and
B can be obtained by solving equations (5) and (11) using data averages,
long-run values and the other calibrated parameters.14 As we require data
for the endogenous variables as shares of human capital, it is important to
obtain a monetary-valued measure of human capital that is comparable to
monetary valued quantities such as consumption, income, physical capital
and government spending. To our knowledge, such a measure does not exist
for the UK. In our related work for the USA (see Angelopoulos et al. (2007b)),
we used data on human and physical capital from Jorgenson and Fraumeni
(1989, 1992a,b).15 These measures are reported in billions of constant 1982
12These are the e¤ective average tax rates KITN, LITR and CITR respectively in
Martinex-Mongay (op cit.).
13See e.g. the Eurostat statistical book, edition 2007, on "Taxation trends in the Euro-
pean Union" for a rich presentation of taxation in all 27 member countries of the EU.
14For this exercise, we obtain a model consistent y. In particular, y is found from
equation (17b), using EO and ONS data. As a dataset for the share of time individuals
spend on education as opposed to work or leisure is not available, we acquire a proxy for
e to calibrate B. This is achieved by assuming that agents spend on average 16 years
on education over the 62 minus 6 years available on average for work or education, so
that agents allocate 28:6% of their non-leisure time to education as opposed to work.
Non-leisure time is found using data on hours worked, obtained from EO.
15Generally, empirical studies use measures of school enrolment ratios or years of school-
ing as general proxies of labor quality or human capital. However, in our setup, these
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dollars for 1949-1984. The basic idea used in the construction of this dataset
is that the output of the education sector is considered as investment in
human capital.16
Unfortunately, such data are not available for the UK. We use, however,
the Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989, 1992a,b) dataset, by setting the depreci-
ation rate for human capital to the value they calculate, so that h = 0:0178.
We also assume that the depreciation rate for physical capital is at 5%, the
level calculated by Jorgenson and Fraumeni, and also set the same deprecia-
tion rate for public capital. Note that the depreciation rates matter for the
long-run value of the investment share in GDP, but have little e¤ect on near
steady-state dynamics in this class of model (see e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999,
p. 954).
To construct a measure of human capital, we use education spending data
from OECD Statistics, following Harbengers (1978) approach17 This data is
then re-scaled by a factor that we nd in the U.S. data 18. We then use this
measure to construct the data averages needed for the calibration of A and
B.
Given the functions for the calibration of A and B, we calibrate 1 and 2
so that we obtain an economically meaningful and data-consistent long-run
solution. In particular, to ensure that the balanced growth rate is equal to
the data average of 1:024, we set a value of (1  1) = 0:49 for the human
capital externality (which implies that the productivity of individual human
capital is 1 = 0:51), and a value of 2 = 0:05 for the productivity of public
proxies are measures of the input to the production function of human capital (time spent
on education) and not of the output of this activity, new human capital.
16In this context, Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1992a) note: investment in human beings,
like investment in tangible form of capital such as buildings and industrial equipment,
generates a stream of future benets. Education is regarded as an investment in human
capital, since benets accrue to an educated individual over a lifetime of activities. Jor-
genson and Fraumeni (1989) also note that in order to construct comparable measures of
investment in human and nonhuman capital, we dene human capital in terms of lifetime
labor incomes for all individuals in the US population. Lifetime labor incomes correspond
to asset values for investment goods used in accounting for physical or nonhuman capital.
17Conolly (2004) provides an example of the Harbenger method which is essentially a
variant of the perpetual inventory method. For example, to initialize the capital series,
education spending in the rst period is divided by the net growth rate of education
spending and by the assumed depreciation rate of human capital. For the other periods,
human capital is equal to the un-depreciated human capital of the previous period plus
new spending on education.
18We used Harbengers method on NIPA accounts data on education spending in USA
and compared the resulting human capital series to the human capital measure given by
Jorgenson and Fraumeni. We found that Harbengers method underestimates the average
value of human capital, so we used the degree of proportionality between the two series in
USA to re-scale Harbengers human capital series for the UK.
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education spending. The value of the gross growth rate of 1:024 is the growth
rate of labour productivity for the UK, calculated using ISDB data.
Regarding the calibrated values of 1 and 2, it is important to report the
following. For higher externalities, the growth rate becomes too low. This
happens because, with very high externalities, there are free riding problems
in the creation of human capital. On the other hand, for low externalities,
the implied share of time allocated to education (e) in the long-run increases
and also the growth rate increases to unrealistic values. The same movements
are observed with changes of 2, although to a lesser extent. By contrast,
our calibrated values (1  1) = 0:49 and 2 = 0:05 guarantee a growth rate
consistent with the data average growth of labour augmenting technology of
2:4%. Finally, note that the calibrated value for 2 is also approximately
equal to the government education spending share in GDP.
3.3 Steady-state solution
The steady-state solution implied by this calibration is reported in Table 2.
As can be seen, the long-run solution for all variables is close to the data
average, or, in the case of the capital shares in GDP, the implied long-run
value using data on private and public investment.
Regarding the allocation of time, there are no data that decompose total
time in work, education and leisure. However, survey data on hours worked
from EO, indicate that agents who work, allocate about 65:3% of their time
to leisure. Hence, the models long-run solution is compatible with the as-
sumption that agents who educate themselves make the same e¤ort/leisure
choice, so that total leisure time in the labour force is 67:5%. In addition,
the model solution indicates that the breakdown of non-leisure time to work
and education e¤ort is roughly two thirds to work and one third to educa-
tion. This is again consistent with the average percentage of the years agents
allocate to education over the total number of years available for work and
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education (i.e. 16=(62  6)).
Table 2: Steady-state solution
variable data average model solution
 1:024 1:024
l N:A: 0:675
e N:A: 0:098
u N:A: 0:227
c=y 0:606 0:567
i=y 0:110 0:150
kp=y 1:433 1:948
kg=y 0:142 0:142
To sum up, this model economy for the UK is consistent with externalities
in private human accumulation and productive public education expenditure.
Lucas (1988) supports a value of human capital externality of 0:4, but (since
his externality is modeled as a direct argument in the goods production func-
tion) its e¤ect on output produced is much higher relative to our calibrated
externality. The associated value of the productivity of public education ex-
penditure, 2 = 0:05, and the value of the productivity of public capital,
a2 = 0:011, are also within the range assumed in the related literature (see
e.g. Blankenau (2005) p. 501).
4 Results: Growth and Welfare
Using the solution of the second-order approximation of the model around
its deterministic steady-state, we now examine the e¤ects on the long-run
growth rate and expected lifetime utility from changes in the composition of
taxes focussing on the policy scenarios introduced in subsection 2.5.19
After dening long-run growth and welfare in subsection 4.1, subsection
4.2 studies the e¤ects of increases in one of the distorting tax rates ( c,  l;  k),
which is met by a decrease in the share of lump-sum taxes (or equivalently
an increase in lump-sum taxes/transfers), ego. Note that in each experiment,
we only change one of the distorting tax rates at a time, allowing ego to adjust
to keep the government budget constraint satised.
Subsection 4.3 then analyses the e¤ects of replacing one distorting tax
rate with another. In particular, we study increases in  c accompanied by
decreases in  l; increases in  k accommodated by decreases in  c; and in-
creases in  l met by decreases in  k: Again, we exogenously alter only one
19We use the Matlab functions made available by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), to
solve and simulate the second-order approximation of the model.
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rate at a time. Finally note that in all policy experiments, we keep the GDP
share of government spending xed at its data average.20
4.1 Measures of long-run growth and expected life-
time utility
Long-run growth is simply measured by the balanced growth rate, , which
is the common constant rate at which all quantities grow in the long-run
of our economy. Welfare is dened as the conditional expectation of the
discounted sum of lifetime utility (see eq. (1)). To this end, we rst undertake
a second-order approximation of the within-period utility function (see eq.
(2)) around the non-stochastic steady-state (see subsection 3.3) and then take
the discounted "innite" sum of approximate within-period utility functions
(see Appendices 6.2-6.4). We undertake this for varying levels of the tax rates
using the solution(s) of the second-order approximation to the stationary
equilibrium as given by equations (17a 19). Note that in comparison to the
related literature (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)), we work with
an endogenous growth model.
4.2 Replacing a distorting tax rate with lump-sum taxes
We start with a comparison of distorting tax rates ( c,  l;  k), when the lump
sum instrument, ego; adjusts to satisfy the government budget constraint.
4.2.1 Growth e¤ects
First, consider the e¤ects of di¤erent tax rates on long-run growth. In Figure
1, subplot (1,1), where (1,1) refers to row and column numbers respectively,
we derive the consumption tax-growth rate relationship. Subplots (1,2) and
(1,3) derive the labour tax-growth rate and capital tax-growth rate relation-
ship respectively.
[Figure 1 about here]
As can be seen, increases in any of the distorting tax rates, holding govern-
ment spending other than transfers and other distorting tax rates constant,
decreases the growth rate. This is as expected given the distortion of indi-
vidual choices. It is worth noting that increases in the labour tax rate hurt
20Here we are referring to the spending activities of the government that make direct use
of real resources and thus enter the economys resource identity in equation (17b) above
(this is what Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) also call "real government spending"; see also
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 16).
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growth more than increases in the other two tax rates. To better under-
stand these e¤ects, Figure 2 plots the e¤ects of the three distorting tax rates
on the main endogenous variables, education time, e, work time, u, private
consumption, c, output, y and investment, i. There are three lines in each
sub-plot in Figure 2. The continuous lines with stars represent the e¤ects of
changes in the consumption tax,  c; the dashed lines the e¤ects of changes
in the capital tax,  k; and nally the continuous lines the e¤ects of changes
in the labour tax,  l.
[Figure 2 about here]
In general, Figure 2 suggests that increases in any of the three distort-
ing tax rates have adverse e¤ects on all endogenous variables. Reference to
output, consumption and investment in Figure 2 shows that the tax rate on
capital has the largest adverse e¤ects followed by the labour and consumption
tax rates respectively. On the other hand, when examining labour market
variables, the negative e¤ects of the labour tax rate are higher than the cap-
ital tax rate. This follows since increases in the labour tax create important
and direct disincentives for both work and education e¤ort. In particular,
the labour tax reduces the return to labour and hence work e¤ort. Moreover,
expected future returns to human capital also fall, thus, leading to a fall in
human capital investment and education e¤ort.21 This latter result explains
why the net growth e¤ect of labour versus capital taxes is larger, as human
capital growth is mainly determined by private education e¤ort. Also, since
consumption taxes reduce education e¤ort by more than capital taxes, the
growth rate is hurt more by consumption than by capital taxes.22
To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to minimize the negative ef-
fects of taxation on long-run growth, and if it is possible for the government
to have a lump-sum tax policy instrument at its disposal, the above results
suggest that higher capital taxes rates are the least harmful, followed by con-
sumption and labour taxes respectively. In other words, the largest marginal
contribution to increasing growth would come from cutting labour taxes.
21Obviously, there are also income e¤ects in the labour markets, due to the changes in
tax rates. As all tax rates decrease income, agents want to work more to make up for the
loss in income. However, for all three tax rates, the substitution e¤ects from lower returns
to work and education time dominate and hence work and education time are reduced in
all cases.
22The reason that consumption taxes decrease work and education e¤ort time is that as
consumption becomes more expensive, agents tend to substitute consumption for leisure.
The reason that capital taxes decrease work and education e¤ort is that these taxes reduce
the return to the labour input (in addition to decreasing the return to the capital input) in
the production function, as human and physical capital are complements in the production
process.
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4.2.2 Welfare e¤ects
We next consider welfare as dened above. The welfare curves for changes in
 c,  l and  k respectively, being met by changes in ego are shown in subplots
(2,1), (2,2) and (2,3) in Figure 1. Again, increases in any of the distorting
tax rates results in decreases in welfare. In our model, welfare depends
on the time-paths of the equilibrium solutions for composite consumption,
growth and leisure time (see the calculations in the Appendix).23 As we
see in Figures 1 and 2, higher tax rates imply less consumption, less growth
and more leisure time (as both work and education time fall with higher tax
rates). The rst two e¤ects dominate so that welfare falls as distorting tax
rates rise.
It is interesting to note that welfare falls more under higher capital tax
rates, compared to higher labour and consumption tax rates. This is despite
the fact that the fall in the growth rate was larger under higher labour and
consumption tax rates (see above subsection). The welfare result pertaining
to capital taxes is due to the large negative e¤ect that these taxes have on
consumption, and also on the fact that leisure is not increased as much by
higher capital taxes as by higher labour and consumption taxes (see Figure
2). Comparing labour and consumption taxes, we see that the adverse e¤ect
of the former is larger although any di¤erences are small. Again, labour taxes
have larger negative e¤ects on consumption, but since they also have larger
positive e¤ects on leisure, the quantitative welfare di¤erences between these
two tax rates are small.
To formally compare the quantitative welfare e¤ects of di¤erent distort-
ing tax rates, we follow e.g. Lucas (1990), Cooley and Hansen (1992) and
Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), and compute the welfare gains, or losses,
associated with alternative tax mixes by computing the percentage change
in private consumption that the individual would require so as to be equally
well o¤ between two policy regimes. This is dened as "" (see Appendix 6.5
for the derivation of  in our model). Subplots (3,1), (3,2) and (3,3) show,
respectively, the welfare gain/loss from consumption over labour taxes, con-
sumption over capital taxes and labour over capital taxes - for a range of
values of ego.
In accordance with our previous discussion, we see rst that there are
welfare gains from higher consumption tax rates as opposed to either higher
labour or capital tax rates, as well as from higher labour as opposed to higher
23Consumption is made up of private and public consumption. However, as we keep
public consumption constant across our experiments, this does not a¤ect the di¤erences
in welfare caused by di¤erent tax rates, which is our aim in this study.
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capital tax rates24. On the contrary, and for symmetrically opposite reasons
to those explained above, there are welfare losses from decreasing consump-
tion as opposed to decreasing either labour or capital tax rates, and from
decreasing labour as opposed to decreasing capital tax rates. The second ob-
servation is that the welfare e¤ects seem to be large in magnitude, especially
when the comparison is with respect to capital taxes. The additional gains
from higher consumption or labour tax rates, instead of capital tax rates,
amount to 2% of consumption for each additional percentage point of ego.
To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to minimize the detrimental
e¤ects of taxation on expected lifetime utility, the above results indicate
that higher consumption tax rates are least harmful followed by labour and
capital taxes respectively. In other words, the largest marginal contribution
to welfare would come from cutting capital taxes. This is also checked below.
4.3 Replacing one distorting tax rate with another one
In this subsection, we assume away the possibility of changes in lump-sum
taxes/transfers, and instead evaluate the growth and welfare e¤ects of re-
placing one distorting tax rate with another. The e¤ects on long-run growth
and welfare are presented in Figure 3, while Figures 4 and 5 present e¤ects
on other endogenous variables.
4.3.1 Growth e¤ects
The e¤ects on the growth rate from increases in the consumption tax rate,
when the labour tax rate is reduced, are shown in Figure 3, subplot (1,1).
Subplots (1,2) and (1,3) show respectively the growth e¤ects from increases
in the capital tax rate when the consumption tax rate is reduced, and from
increases in the labour tax rate when the capital tax rate is reduced. In all
experiments, all the other policy rate components in the government budget
constraint remain unchanged.
Note rst that increases in labour taxes vis-a-vis both capital and con-
sumption taxes hurt the growth rate (see subplots (1,3) and (1,2) respec-
tively). In addition, capital taxes hurt the growth rate more than consump-
tion taxes, but the e¤ects in this case are trivial (see subplot (1,2)).
[Figure 3 about here]
In Figure 4, we present the e¤ects on other endogenous variables from
changes in the two income tax rates ( l and  k), when accommodated by
24Note that the data average of the residually determined ego share is 16:9%.
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changes in the consumption tax rate,  c. There are two lines in each sub-plot
in Figure 4. The continuous lines present the e¤ects of changes in the labour
tax,  l, met by changes in  c, while the lines with stars present the e¤ects
of changes in the capital tax,  k, met by changes in  c. This gure helps
us to better understand the e¤ects of income (labour and capital) tax rates
vis-a-vis the consumption tax rate. As can be seen, substituting a reduced
income tax rate for a higher consumption tax rate has positive e¤ects on
output, consumption and investment, which are larger when it is the capital
income tax rate that is reduced. Regarding the labour market, lower labour
income tax rates result in increases in both work and education e¤ort time
as the returns to work and education get higher, while lower capital income
tax rates result in a decrease in work and education e¤ort time. In this case,
it is the income e¤ects that dominate (recall that income is increased when
the capital tax rate is decreased) so that agents can a¤ord to enjoy more
leisure time. These di¤erent e¤ects on education time explain why growth
is reduced when labour taxes rise relative to consumption taxes, and why
growth is increased when capital taxes rise relative to consumption taxes.
[Figures 4-5 about here]
In Figure 5, we present the e¤ects on endogenous variables from switching
from labour tax rates,  l, to capital tax rates,  k. As can be seen, increases
in  l; met by decreases in  k; boost output, consumption and investment. On
the other hand, work and education e¤ort time are reduced when  l rises. In
this case, both the substitution (higher labour tax) and income e¤ects work
in the same direction in the labour market. Hence, the fall in the growth
rate when  l rises and  k falls.
To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth by
altering the distorting tax rates, our results suggest that labour taxes should
be reduced, while simultaneously increasing capital or consumption taxes to
make up for the loss in labour tax revenue. However, the gains in terms of
growth from such changes in the tax structure are found to be very small, in
accordance with the results in Lucas (1990) and Stokey and Rebelo (1995).
In particular, if the tax rate on labour was reduced to 20% (starting from
the data average of 26.5%), the net growth rate would increase to 2.46%
(when the capital tax increases) or to about 2.44% (when the consumption
tax increases), from the data average of 2.41%.
4.3.2 Welfare e¤ects
The welfare curves are shown below their respective growth curves in Figure
3. As can be inferred from subplots (2,1) and (2,2), higher consumption tax
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rates, met by reduced tax rates on labour or capital are welfare improving.
Compared to labour taxes, higher consumption taxes imply higher consump-
tion (see Figure 4) and growth. They also imply less leisure, but the rst two
e¤ects dominate so that welfare rises as the ratio of consumption to labour
tax rates goes up. Compared to capital taxes, higher consumption taxes
again imply higher consumption and leisure. They also imply less growth
but, since this adverse e¤ect is very small, the rst two e¤ects dominate and
welfare rises substantially as the ratio of consumption to capital taxes rises.
Finally, in subplot (2,3), a higher labour to capital tax rate ratio, although
bad for growth, is good for welfare. As can be seen in Figure 5, the reason
is that as labour tax rates rise and capital tax rates fall, both consumption
and leisure rise and this increases welfare.
Finally, we turn to a quantitative assessment of how much these tax
switches can benet the economy. We calculate the welfare gains/losses of
increasing the ratio of consumption to labour, capital to consumption, and
labour to capital tax rates. The results are presented in subplots (3,1) to
(3,3) respectively in Figure 3. In each case, the gains/losses are calculated
with respect to the mean value of the respective tax ratios in the data. In
each of the subplots, then, point zero on the vertical axis represents the
current combination of tax rates in the UK.
The results suggest important welfare gains from re-allocating the tax
burden away from capital to labour income and even bigger ones by shifting
it to consumption spending. For instance, if the capital tax is decreased from
its data average of 47% to 43%, welfare gains of about 1% of consumption
can be obtained permanently if the loss in tax revenue is met by an increase
in the labour tax. Whereas welfare gains of about 1.5% of consumption can
be obtained permanently if the loss in tax revenue is by an increase in the
consumption tax. Smaller welfare benets are realized from substituting the
labour tax with a consumption tax. For instance, welfare gains of about 0.2%
of consumption can be made in this case if the labour tax is decreased from
its data average of 26.5% to 23%. Note, these examples involve small changes
in the tax rates (of about 10% change in the tax rates) that are within the
historical (recent) experience for the UK.25 Quantitatively, the welfare e¤ects
reported here are similar to the e¤ects reported in Lucas (1990), Cooley and
Hansen (1992) and McGrattan (1994).
To summarize, if the goal of tax policy is to promote welfare by altering
the distorting tax rates, our results suggest that capital taxes should be re-
25We report that the KITN e¤ective average tax rate from ECFIN is between 40.5 and
52.2 for the period 1980-2000. LITR is between 24.5 and 28.5 for the same period, while
CITR is between 17.3 and 20.5.
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duced, while simultaneously increasing labour or consumption taxes to make
up for the loss in capital tax revenue. Our ndings further suggest that it is
also welfare improving, but less so, to reduce labour taxes, while increasing
consumption taxes.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the quantitative implications of changes in the
composition of taxes for long-run growth and expected lifetime utility in the
UK economy from 1970-2005. We employed a DSGE setup incorporating a
detailed scal policy structure and where the engine of endogenous growth
was human capital accumulation. The model was based on Lucass (1990)
model, which we extended by allowing for: (i) a more realistic disaggregation
of government spending into its basic growth and utility promoting activities;
(ii) a consumption tax; (iii) externalities from economy-wide human capital;
and (iv) uncertainty in the model economy.
Our results suggest that the growth e¤ects of tax reforms are likely to be
small, whereas the welfare e¤ects can be substantial. In particular, our results
suggest that if the goal of tax policy is to promote long-run growth by altering
relative tax rates, then it should reduce labour taxes while simultaneously
increasing capital or consumption taxes to make up for the loss in labour
tax revenue. In contrast, welfare promoting policy would be to cut capital
taxes while concurrently increasing labour or consumption taxes to make up
for the loss in capital tax revenue.The ndings in this paper are similar to
those obtained in similar studies for the U.S. and they also appear consistent
with the important normative result that capital should not be taxed in the
medium and long run (see e.g. Chamley (1986) and Lucas (1990)).
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6 Appendix
6.1 Instantaneous utility
Using the notation set out in the paper, rst consider the per capita repre-
sentation of the instantaneous utility function given by (2) :
U t =
[(X t)
(lt)
1 ]1 
1   (A:1)
where X t  Ct+ Gct denotes per capita composite consumption. Using our
notation for stationary variables:
U t =
[(xtH t)
(lt)
1 ]1 
1   (A:2)
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where xt 

Xt
Ht

, is stationary composite consumption andH t is the beginning-
of-period human capital stock. Since t  H t+1=H t; we have for t  1 :
H t = H0
 
t 1Y
s=0
s
!
(A:3)
where H0 is given from initial conditions.
Substituting (A3) into (A2) gives
U t =

H0xt

t 1Q
s=0
s

(lt)
1 
1 
1   for t  1 (A:4a)
U0 =
 
H0x0

(l0)
1 1 
1   for t = 0. (A:4b)
6.2 Steady-state utility
We next dene the long-run as the state without stochastic shocks which
implies that stationary variables are constant. Using (A4:a; b), utility at the
steady-state can be written as
U

t =
[(H0x
t)(l)1 ]1 
1   . (A:5)
where the * superscript denotes steady-state per capita utility. In the steady-
state, non-stationary X t grows at the constant rate , which in turn implies
for ;  > 1 that the growth of U

t is constant and less than unity.
6.3 Second-order approximation of within period util-
ity
Dene for simplicity a variable zt  xt

t 1Q
s=0
s

, so that the second-order
approximation of the within-period utility function in (A:4) around its long-
run is:
U
s
t ' U

t+[Uzz]bzt+[Ull]blt+12[Uzz+Uzzz2]bz2t+12[Ull+Ulll2]bl2t+[Uzlzl]bztblt (A:6)
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where the partial derivatives in (A6), evaluated at the steady-state, are:
Uz =
[(H0z)

(l)1 ]1 
z
Ul =
(1 )[(H0z)(l)1 ]1 
l
Uzz =
[(1 ) 1][(H0z)(l)1 ]1 
z2
Ull =
(1 )[(1 )(1 ) 1][(H0z)(l)1 ]1 
l2
Uzl =
(1 )(1 )[(H0z)(l)1 ]1 
zl
;
the second-order approximations for bzt and blt are:
bzt = bxt +Pt 1s=0 bs, wherebxt '  cc+gcbct +  gcc+gcbgct + 12  cc+gc    cc+gc2 (bct)2
+1
2

gc
c+gc
 

gc
c+gc
2
(bgct )2    cgc(c+gc)2bctbgct
andblt '     u1 u e but     e1 u e bet   12 h u1 u e +   u1 u e2i (but)2
 1
2
h
e
1 u e +
 
e
1 u e
2i
(bet)2    ue(1 u e)2 butbet;
and nally the second-order approximations for (bzt)2 and (blt)2 are:
(bzt)2 = (bxt)2 +  Pt 1s=0 bs2 + 2bxtPt 1s=0 bs; where
(bxt)2 '  cc+gc2 (bct)2 +  gcc+gc2 (bgct )2 + 2 cgc(c+gc)2bctbgct
2bxtPt 1s=0 bs ' 2 cc+gcbctPt 1s=0 bs + 2 gcc+gcbgctPt 1s=0 bs
and
(blt)2 '   u1 u e2 (but)2 +   e1 u e2 (bet)2 + 2 ue(1 u e)2 butbet.
The above gives the second-order approximation, U
s
t ; for any t  1: There-
fore at t = 0 , the expression for U
s
t is the same except that z0  x0.
6.4 Second-order approximation of lifetime utility
Finally, expected lifetime utility, Vt, is given by the expected discounted sum
of U
s
0 and U
s
t , i.e.:
Vt ' U s0 + E0
1X
t=1
tU
s
t (A:7)
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In the simulations, T = 300 years and the sample average for V is calcu-
lated using 1000 simulations.26
6.5 Welfare comparisons
Let X
A
t denote the contingent plan for per capita composite consumption
associated with tax structure A; and X
B
t the contingent plan for per capita
composite consumption associated with structure B. We can then, following
e.g. Lucas (1990), dene  as the constant fraction of regimeBs consumption
process that a household would be willing to give up to be as well o¤ under
A as under B. Hence, we write:
V At = (1  )(1 )V Bt (A:8)
Solving for ; we obtain:
ln(1  ) = 1
(1  )  ln

V At
V Bt

)  ' 1
(1  )  ln

V At
V Bt

(A:9)
where, V Bt and V
A
t are calculated by using the second-order approximation
of welfare as dened in (A7) above and averaged over 1000 simulations.
26Note that studies that use quarterly data, usually work with 1000 quarters, which
implies 250 years.
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Figure 1: Growth and welfare effects of changes in tax rates (relative to transfers)
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Figure 2: Effects of changes in tax rates accommodated by transfers
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Figure 3: Growth and welfare effects of changes in relative tax rates
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Figure 4: Effects of changes in income tax rates accomodated by consumption tax
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Figure 5: Effects of changes in capital tax accomodated by labour tax
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